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The Tension Between Rules
and Discretion in Family Law:
A Report and Reflection
CARL E. SCHNEIDER*

I. Introduction
The history of law is many things. But one of them is the story
of an unremitting struggle between rules and discretion. 1 The tension
between these two approaches to legal problems continues to pervade
and perplex the law today. Perhaps nowhere is that tension more pronounced and more troubling than in family law. It is probably impossible
to practice family law without wrestling with the imponderable choice
between rules and discretion.
Consider, for example, how many areas of family law are now being
fought over in-just those terms. For decades we have lived with an
abundantly discretionary way of resolving child-custody disputes: The
best-interests-of-the-child standard has long been understood to give
judges acres of room to roam. Yet in recent years scholar after scholar
has inveighed against the discretionary scope that standard permits
judges, and jurisdiction after jurisdiction has adopted one or another
standard-the primary caretaker presumption or joint custody, for in-

*For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chicago
L Rev 1343 (1986), I use the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation (Lawyers
Co-operative, 1989).
1. A recent and rich examination of that struggle is Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses
of Discretion (Oxford U Press, 1992). My own attempt to examine systematically the
analytic components of the struggle (Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View) is to be
found in that volume. Other recent works on discretion include Aharon Barak, Judicial
Discretion (Yale U Press, 1989); D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study
of Official Discretion (Oxford U Press, 1990). A particularly useful recent study of
rules in law is Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination
of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford U Press, 1991).
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stance-intended to cabin, crib, and confine the range of judicial discretion.2
Judicial discretion has also been the target of recent reforms in the
law of child support. As social determination to charge fathers with the
costs of rearing their children has intensified, so has dissatisfaction with
the way judges have exercised their very considerable discretion in
setting child support obligations. This dissatisfaction has resulted in
federal requirements that states substitute relatively mechanical and
limiting "guidelines" for judicial discretion.
Judicial discretion has not been the only target of attack. Unhappiness
with the way police and prosecutors have exercised their freedom in
deciding how to respond to spouse abuse has similarly been assailed.
This assault has led to rules which require police to arrest spouse abusers
when specified criteria are met and which oblige prosecutors to prosecute with unaccustomed regularity.
In the area of child abuse and neglect we may observe an equally
fervent criticism of discretion, albeit one that leads to less prosecution
rather than more. In this area, the doubters of discretion have argued
that open-ended statutes have given social workers, police, prosecutors,
and courts too broad a power to intrude on families. In consequence,
the doubters say, intervention is all too likely where it is not justified
and even where it will harm more than help. These arguments have
helped inspire a movement toward statutes which define child abuse
much more precisely and particularly than before and which thus seek
to limit the discretion of officials to intervene in the lives of parents and
children. 3
But not all modem family law describes a movement from discretion
to rules. For decades-for centuries-American divorce courts have
divided marital property according to two rule-based systems-the
community-property and the common-law regimes. Over time, each
system became increasingly elaborate, formalized, and rule-bound. In
the last few years, these defects have helped impel many states to adopt
an unashamedly discretionary substitute-the equitable-distribution
principle.
Indeed, a number of recent reforms in family law have enlarged
the scope of judicial discretion (although that was not their immediate
2. For a survey and criticism of those critics and a cautious defense of discretion
in the law of child custody, see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child
Custody and the UMDA 's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MichL Rev 2215 (1991).
3. A particularly clear example of this trend is Juvenile Justice Standards Project,
Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Standards Relating
to Abuse and Neglect (1981).
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purpose). For instance, courts are increasingly willing to enforce various kinds of premarital contracts and contracts between unmarried
cohabitants. This reform has heightened the ability of couples to organize their own affairs in legally binding ways. But it has also given
courts new kinds of discretion-discretion to choose which contracts to
enforce, to evaluate the conscionability of contracts, and to determine
how to interpret them. Similarly, courts are now assuming broader
discretion than ever before to decide when a group of people is a ''family" and what legal consequences that conclusion ought to have.
In short, family law has recently been roiled by much debate and
many changes in which the contest between rules and discretion features
centrally. This contest is hardly resolved. Every day lawyers argue in
courts and legislatures around the country about whether a judge may
and should exercise discretion, about whether a court should adopt a
discretion-limiting rule, about whether a legislature should preempt
judicial discretion by devising authoritative standards.
So pressing do this subject and these controversies continue to be that
at the conference on "Family Law for the Next Century," they were
one of the three principal subjects for consideration among the academics and practicing lawyers who met for discussion. The conferees were
asked to try to analyze systematically the advantages and drawbacks of
both rules and discretion in the family law setting. They were also asked
to investigate whether there is an optimal mix of rules and discretion
in family law. This essay reports and reflects on their deliberations.
Before turning to the substance of my report, I should acknowledge
the difficulty of recording and recounting the intricate and stimulating
conversations that flowed during the nine hours devoted to the topic of
rules and discretion. The conferees disagreed freely, frequently, and
even fiercely .4 While they often strove to reach a consensus, and while
they sometimes seemed to have succeeded, the consensus was commonly fragile. It quickly cracked and crumbled when further discussions forced the conferees to discover that their agreement was purely
semantic, that their concord was merely superficial. 5
But this inability to reach a stable consensus was not, I think, fortuitous. Rather, it arose from the hard fact that the choice between discre4. Interestingly, disagreements did not develop neatly along the divide between
academics and practitioners. The practitioners were perhaps likelier to find attractions
in discretion and to fear the bureaucratization of family law; the academics were perhaps
likelier to cite empirical studies and deplore their scarcity. But ultimately and notably,
academics and practitioners were united by a sense of the complexity and recalcitrance
of the problem of discretion and rules.
5. For similar conclusions, see Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilities for
Extended Family Members?, 27 FAM. L. Q. 191, 211 (1993).
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tion and rules must be a difficult one. Both rules and discretion have
numerous and elaborately interacting benefits and burdens, so that when
we walk toward one blessing we walk away from another. And the
balance of advantage will slide and shift depending on the specific
situation in which the choice is posed. Thus the choice between discretion and rules will irredeemably be complex and uncertain and ''will
depend on factors that will be difficult to assess and that will vary from
circumstance to circumstance (so that it is not unreasonable for lawyers
to look to particular contexts in evaluating discretion and rules). " 6

II. Detlning Discretion
As they began to debate the relative merits of rules and discretion, the
conferees quickly realized that the legal system rarely if ever presents a
plain choice between "rules" on one hand and "discretion" on the
other. Rather, there is a continuum between rules and discretion, and
most, if not all, legal regimes fall somewhere along, and not on the ends
of, the continuum.
On one end of the continuum, of course, are rules. But rules themselves come in varying strengths. Indeed, it is surprisingly difficult to
state a rule for an important subject that leaves no room for interpretation
at least on its margins. Toward the "rule" end of the continuum are
a series of devices that are intended to limit decision-makers but that
are less directive than rules. These include the principles, policies,
guidelines, presumptions, and lists of factors in which family law
abounds.
At the other end of the continuum is discretion. But discretion too
comes in strong and weak forms. Professor Dworkin, one of the most
influential writers on discretion, says that a person has discretion in the
strong form "when he is simply not bound by standards set by the
authority in question. " 7 Professor Dworkin identifies two "weak"
forms of discretion: "Sometimes we use 'discretion' in a weak sense,
simply to say that for some reason the standards an official must apply
cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgment.' ' 8 The
other weak sense refers to occasions when "some official has fmal
authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed by
any other official. ' ' 9
6. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in Keith Hawkins,
ed., The Uses of Discretion 49 (Oxford U Press, 1992) (Schneider, Discretion and
Rules).
7. Ronald Dworkin, Takings Rights Seriously § 32 (Harvard U Press, 1977).
8. ld at 31.
9. ld at 32.
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Further complicating the issue is the discovery that discretion comes
in a smorgasbord of forms. There is, for instance, discretion to find
facts, discretion to choose rules, discretion to make rules, discretion to
interpret rules, and discretion to apply the rules to the facts. Furthermore, most legal regimes feature not just one of the approaches I listed,
but rather a mix of them. In handling a single case, a judge may,
for example, be governed by some rules, some principles, and some
presumptions, and may be freed by several forms of discretion. So
numerous, so inevitable, and so intertwined are these approaches that,
even when you have a highly discretionary standard, there are constraints. And even when you have a highly rule-bound standard, there
is room for manoeuver.
The conferees rapidly identified another complicating feature of the
tension between rules and discretion: Any regime's mix of rules and
discretion is likely to be dynamic, to be unstable, to be in flux. For
instance, if the balance tilts heavily toward the discretion end of the
spectrum, rules often begin to emerge. Judges chafe under the burdens
of discretion and informally begin to rely on rules of thumb. Those rules
of thumb are gradually converted into formally expressed case law. The
precedents of case law then begin to shape themselves into articulated
rules. Legislatures in their tum sometimes convert those rules into
statutory law. Thus is re-enacted the age-old common-law process.
Nor are rules necessarily stable. Over time, a system of rules can
become intolerably complex, rigid, and anachronistic. Courts struggle
. to interpret such rules in ways that accommodate the terms of all the
relevant rules, that accord with the applicable case law, and that accomplish justice. Those struggles cannot be wholly successful, and they
produce yet more complicated-and inconsistent-rules. Eventually,
the structure can collapse of its own weight. This may be part of what
has happened to the traditional common-law and community-property
systems for dividing marital assets on divorce.
The instability of a pure system of rules has yet another source. The
conferees widely believed that, if you try to squeeze off discretion in
one place, it will simply ooze out again in another. This can happen in
a variety of ways. Most blatantly, judges can simply choose to disregard
the law. And given the deference appellate courts commonly concede
to judges in many family law subjects, they may be able to get away
with doing so.
But the conferees generally felt this did not happen often. Rather,
they believed that the complexity of family law decisions gives judges
numerous straightforward ways to retrieve lost discretion. Suppose, for
example, the legislature says to the judge, you must divide marital
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property equally. The judge may conscientiously follow that directive,
but devote new attention to the rewardingly discretionary question of
how property should be defined. Or suppose that the legislature adopts
child-support standards that deprive judges of their former authority in
making child-support orders. Judges may respond by altering their
alimony, marital-property, and attorney-fee awards to achieve the overall result that they believe just.
The conferees were also impressed by another judicial tactic for
preserving discretion. The trial court's power to find facts is not only
enormously important. It is also authority quite lightly checked by
appellate courts. Several conferees pointed to valuation questions as
particularly crucial, complex, and baffling, and as ·thus permitting
judges significant freedom whatever rule of law nominally governed
their decisions.
Nor is judicial discretion the only kind that can be hard to suppress.
For example, litigants too exercise discretion. They are, after all, the
ones who decide when to commence litigation, and they have the power
to end it. One function of family law is to try to control when and why
litigation is begun and halted. But the litigants are likely to be the players
whose discretion may be hardest to control because their behavior is
least susceptible to the law's incentives. As one conferee remarked, "It.
doesn't matter what you call [your child-custody] rule, if the parties
want to fight, they will. "
In short, every regime will comprise a richly complex mixture of
discretion and rules. And any regime's mixture will be kept unstable
by many forces. The dynamics and demands oflaw as a system are one.
The need of lawyers to locate arguments that will serve their clients'
interests is another. The desire of judges for the authority to make wise
decisions is yet a third. And brooding over all these are the broad social
developments that change the context in which all the players work and
the ways in which they think and act.

ID. The Delights of Discretion
What, then, are the attractions of discretion? Perhaps its leading
virtue is that it gives a judge authority to respond to the full range of
circumstances a case presents and thus to do justice in each individual
case. The conferees agreed without noticeable dissent that the need for
individualized justice in family law is particularly pressing. People
organize and conduct their family lives in a burgeoning and bewildering
variety of ways. And a court's resolution of a family dispute will matter
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to the parties more deeply and durably than in perhaps any other kind
of civil litigation.
Of course, even though family law disputes vary widely and matter
greatly, the costs of individualized decisions might still outweigh their
benefits. On this point, there may have been some difference between
the practitioners and the academics. Practitioner after practitioner was
eager to tell the story of a particularly meritorious-irresistibly appealing, even-client whose case would have been unjustly-outrageously,
even-resolved had the judge lacked discretion to rise above a narrow
interpretation of the applicable rule. The academics, on the other hand,
were as a group inclined to think that these stories might be relatively
rare exceptions. They suspected that most litigants might fall into a few
identifiable categories. They were thus reluctant to foreswear rules.
A number of the conferees saw another substantial merit in discretion.
They pointed out that we seem to be undergoing a period of rapid social
change in those parts oflife family law seeks to regulate. They observed
that rules are intended to, and often do, change grudgingly and ponderously. Discretion, on the other hand, allows the judge to respond expeditiously to society's evolving preferences and practices.
Flexibility, then, is the leading positive argument for discretion. But
that argument can also be usefully put in a negative form: Discretion
is necessary where no satisfactory rule can be written. Indeed, as I have
suggested elsewhere, the three basic reasons in Western law for granting
discretionary authority all arise out of problems in writing rules. What
I call rule-failure discretion ''is created where it is believed that cases
will arise in circumstances so varied, so complex, and so unpredictable
that satisfactory rules that will accurately guide decision-makers to
correct results in a sufficiently large number of cases cannot be written.'' 10 The best-interest standard, among others, is readily understood
and often explained in rule-failure terms.
Also arising from problems writing rules is rule-building discretion.
It is resorted to ''where the rule-maker could devise tolerably effective
rules, but concludes that better rules would be developed (or that the
same rules could be developed more efficiently) if the decision-makers
were allowed to develop rules for themselves as they go along. " 11 This,
of course, is the standard rationale for the common-law process. And
it may well explain what is happening today in, for example, the field
of marital contracts.
10. Schneider, Discretion and Rules cited in note 6.
11. Id at 64.
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Finally, rule-compromise discretion has a similar source. It occurs
where ''the members of the governmental body responsible for instructing the decision-maker cannot agree on rules or even guidelines,
and . . . deliberately choose to pass responsibility on to the decisionmaker. " 12 The rule-compromise problem may well explain, for instance, why legislatures have simply instructed courts to divide property
"equitably" rather than specifying what "equitable" might mean.
The conferees were far too burdened deciphering the larger issues
of the tension between discretion and rules to try to show that satisfactory rules could replace discretion in any area of family law. But occasional disagreements on points of substance hinted that writing tolerable
rules would not be easy. Part of the problem, to be sure, lay in differences in political and social viewpoints. But even people with similar
views on broad questions found it hard to articulate their goals, to
anticipate how families might behave, and to specify rules that achieved
their goals in all (or even enough) of the situations in which families
might find themselves.
Another way of evaluating discretion's merits is to ask whether it
enhances litigants' sense that justice has been done. Interestingly, a
large number of practitioners reported that what their clients often
seemed to want most was the opportunity to say their piece, to explain
in their own terms why their marriage had ended and why they were
entitled to what they claimed. These clients were anxious to believe that
someone had listened to them, particularly on questions of marital fault.
From this point of view, discretion is attractive because it may give the
litigants more scope to appeal to a less-than-formal source of justice. 13

IV. The Rewards of Rules
I have been suggesting that, like other students of discretion, the
conferees saw real strengths in the flexibility discretion offers family
law. What, then, is to be said in favor of rules? Like other students of
12. Id at 65. One form of discretion is created for its own sake and not because of
difficulties in writing rules. This is what Max Weber called khadi justice.
It is created where it is thought that decision-makers can be found who are wise, who
understand the principles of justice, and who already know or are well placed to
discover the relevant facts, sometimes through acquaintance with the parties or
through personal enquiry of people who know them.
Id at 61. King Solomon's celebrated child-custody decision is a classic example. However, this version of discretion is, in its pure form, foreign to our legal system.
13. One lawyer reported that, in his experience, wise judges listened attentively
while litigants had their say, even if that say had little to do with the court's rules of
decision or with the considerations the judge would later rely on.
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discretion, the conferees felt that a primary attraction of rules is that they
conduce to ''efficiency.'' Rules reduce the possible range of decisions,
thereby saving the time and tempers of courts, lawyers, and clients.
And, as Whitehead deliciously observed, rules relieve us of the burden
of working out afresh our solutions to recurring problems:
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by
eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the
habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case.
Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations
which we can perform without thinking about them. Operations of thought
are like cavalry charges in a battle-they are strictly limited in number, they
require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments. 14

"Efficiency" is not a goal family law has historically valued. It is
a cold virtue for so warm a subject. But several conferees proposed that
efficiency is more desirable than we often think. They noted that most
divorcing couples have little property to divide and no money to spare
for legal fees. Even if they needed individualized justice (and some of
the conferees believed that the problems of such couples were often not
complex and regularly fell into identifiable patterns), they simply could
not afford it.
Efficiency is not the only goal rules are usually thought to serve well.
The planning function is another. People need to know what the law
says so that they can organize their lives rationally. Rules seem likelier
than discretion to inform people what the law is and what courts will do.
Rules are, after all, publicly stated and thus are, relatively, accessible to
prospective litigants. And rules are precisely an attempt to state in
advance how cases should be decided.
In family law, the planning function may be relevant in two ways.
First, people may want to know what the law is while they are married
so that they can maximize their chances in any eventual divorce action.
Second, people may want to understand the law when they are seeking
a divorce so that they can "bargain in the shadow of the law." 15 The
conferees asked how much families sought and used information about
the law in each of those circumstances.
The conferees were generally skeptical that many people were much
interested in or affected by family law while they are married. This
surely seems plausible. Most people doubt that they are the ones who
14. Alfred North Whitehead, An Introduction to Mathematics 61 (H Holt and Co
1911).
15. This phrase, which was often deployed in our discussions, is from Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950 (1979).
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will become divorce statistics. And most people are likelier to shape
their behavior according to their own moral beliefs and to the social
norms that surround them than to the more distant commands of the
law. For that matter, most people don't know what the law of divorce
is.I6
Of course, all this could change when a husband and wife decide to
divorce and know that, if they cannot resolve their differences, a court
will do it for them. Nevertheless, the conferees pointed out that many
spouses will still not be significantly affected by the law. First, in many
cases the law's dictates will be irrelevant because the couple will not
have disputes the law offers to solve. That is, many divorcing couples
have neither property nor children to divide.
Second, some couples will, despite incentives to the contrary, not
know what the law is. Third, some couples will know what the law is,
but believe the chances of actually going all the way through litigation
are so slim that it is not worth taking the law into account. 17 Fourth,
some-perhaps many-couples will know what the law is and believe
that they may eventually have to go to court, but be more swayed by
their personal preferences and their own moral and social codes than
by the law. 18
But there is a further wrinkle. Even if spouses engaged in bargaining
know and respond to the law's commands, it is not plain that rules
16. On this last point, see, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U Mich J L Reform 217, 236-3 7 ( 1990). For an extended examination of the
general irrelevance of family law to most of family life, see Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L Rev 197, 203-09.
One practitioner did report, however, having a client who decided several years in
advance to seek a divorce and who consulted the practitioner for advice on how to
behave during those years in order to maximize the chance of receiving custody of the
couple's children.
17. The usual estimate is that at least 90% of divorces are settled without litigation.
A careful, thorough, and recent study (albeit one confined to California) by Eleanor
E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas
of Custody 159 (Harvard U Press, 1992), reports that only about 1.5% of the cases
studied eventuated in a formal adjudication. This study also learned that three-quarters
of the families investigated "experienced little if any conflict over the terms of the
divorce decree." Id.
18. Some interesting hints of the true complexity of these questions may be found
in the study by Maccoby and Mnookin I cited in the preceding footnote. They report,
for instance, that while the law's requirement that the non-custodial parent ordinarily
have visitation rights and pay child support seems to have affected settlement
agreements, it is far from clear that the law has had real effect on the larger question
of which parent should receive custody. As to that question, ''family law may reflect
and reinforce some tendencies, but its effects will be mainly at the margins, affecting
mainly those cases in which the preexisting parental roles are unclear or in which
parents are ambivalent about what they want." ld at 280.
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announce those commands markedly better than discretion, at least (and
of course this is a significant qualification) for those spouses who have
lawyers. A number of practitioners confidently reported that they could
predict with reasonable assurance what any single judge was likely to
do. And a great many practitioners were basically convinced that they
could accurately predict what their local bench in general would usually
do. 19
As I have been reporting, the conferees broadly agreed that rules
generally serve law's efficiency and planning functions better than discretion. They were also alert to another way in which rules might be
preferable to discretion in family law. They frequently remarked that
rules often promote better than discretion law's "expressive" function.
The expressive function is mobilized when the law is used to make
statements that have symbolic importance. 20
The law of child custody provides several illuminating examples of
the use and usefulness of the law's expressive function. Several of the
conferees remarked that women continue to receive custody in a notably
high proportion of the cases no matter what legal rule purports to govern
custody decisions. Why then do so many people continue to be exercised
about custody rules? Partly, these conferees contended, because those
rules have symbolic resonances that matter to people and that may even
shape thinking and behavior. For instance, some of the conferees saw
the primary-custodian rule as making a valuable statement about the
legitimacy of women's claims to custody. Others saw that rule as a way
of telling fathers as a class to get lost. Even the best-interest standard
can be understood as a social affirmation that the concerns of children
are overridingly important. 21
Finally some conferees saw a virtue in rules where other conferees
had seen a virtue in discretion. These conferees argued that rules could
19. Even this interesting point does not fully end the list of relevant considerations.
The standard "law and economics" view is that certain rules promote settlements,
since such rules should give one party a powerful tool for exacting agreement from the
other. On the other hand, several lawyers at the conference reached the opposite
conclusion. They believed that litigants are driven by uncertain rules to finding some
mutual accommodation rather than trusting to the uncertain preferences of an unpredictable court. It might also be said that, the more uncertain the law, the more room the
parties have to negotiate the agreement that comes closest to reflecting their own
preferences and standards.
20. On the expressive function in family law, see Mary Ann Glendon, Abonion and
Divorce in Western Law (Harvard U Press, 1987); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing
Parenthood, 98 Yale L I 293 (1988); and Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions
of Family Law, 22 UC DAVIS L REv 991 (1989). On the functions of family law
generally, see Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (West Publishing, forthcoming).
21. Similarly, a number of conferees saw the presumption that marital property
should be divided equally as a social pronouncement on the moral basis of marriage.
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enhance litigants' satisfaction (or, more accurately, reduce their dissatisfaction) better than discretion. Litigants may feel that a decision based
observably on rules is at least not arbitrary and discriminatory. As
one lawyer commended, "Clients want to be treated the same way as
everybody else." Rules make even-handedness easier to demonstrate
and to perceive.
Along these lines, several lawyers commented that rules helped them
in their relations with their clients. As one lawyer observed, "Sometimes clients have very unreasonable expectations, and clear rules help
control them.'' (''Control'' here meant guiding the client toward claims
that stood some chance of success and toward the hope of settling
the dispute on reasonable terms.) Ultimately, however, the conferees
ruefully acknowledged that few losing litigants can summon up the
detachment to be happy with their encounter with the law.
These observations about how rules can promote the satisfaction of
litigants could be expanded to make a more general point. Rules may
serve better than discretion the goal of treating like cases alike. If each
decision-maker has discretion to decide case by case what principles to
apply and how to apply them, cases that are essentially similar are likely
to be decided differently. Rules, on the other hand, work to suppress
differences of opinion among decision-makers. Furthermore, rules
serve as record-keeping devices, so that decision-makers can more
easily coordinate their rulings over time and among themselves.
However, there is a counter-argument. It might be said that the
problem with rules is exactly that they work by establishing large categories in which a range offactual situations is subsumed. Even though
a group of cases fits under a single rule, there will usually be some
differences among them. In other words, rules lump cases together
which are not identical, and in this way rules seem to ensure that like
cases will not be decided alike. There is a solution to this failing of
rules, of course. It is to write rules as narrowly as possible. But the
more narrowly a rule is written, the more difficult it becomes to write
and the more rigid it becomes to apply.

V. Why is Discretion Tolerable?
Both lawyers and the laity conventionally regard law as a system of
rules. The drawbacks and dangers of discretion are well-known and
often recited. Yet discretion pervades law. Legislators and the executive
exercise the authority they receive from ''the people'' in dramatically
discretionary ways. Administrators high and low command wide swaths
of discretion in deciding how their agencies should perform the tasks
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they are assigned. Judges wield all the kinds of discretion we have
already charted, and more besides. Jurors exercise their fact-finding
authority almost without formal supervision. And not just the litigants,
but also their lawyers, make discretionary decisions that are far from
trivial.
What, if anything, makes all this discretion tolerable? The conferees
talked interestingly about one little-remarked but basic factor that speaks
directly to the tolerability and desirability of discretion-the ability and
reliability of judges. As Professor Cooper sensibly wrote in considering
discretion and interlocutory appeals:
The nature and quality of the federal district judges is the single most important factor to be counted. The better the judges are, the less need there
is for frequent interlocutory appeal-they will make fewer mistakes, and
more often correct their own mistakes before serious harm is done .... To
the extent that we do not trust trial judges, on the other hand, we will be
driven to rely more on clear rules or on discretionary devices that are
controlled by the courts of appeals. 22

In short, we want good judges to have discretion, but not bad ones.
A bad rule can do more harm than a single bad judge. A crucial question,
then, is how many bad judges there are. Most intriguingly, a truly
substantial number of conferees said that the judges who decide family
law cases are, as a whole, competent and conscientious, although not
brilliant. 23 Several conferees calculated that they had only had to deal
with one really incompetent judge at any one time or even over the
course of their careers.
Not everyone concurred in this (rather temperate) praise of the bench.
A few conferees dissented, and some others said that judicial "bias"
could influence judicial decisions. But it was not clear what the nature,
depth, or perils of those biases were, and they did not loom large in our
discussions.
The conferees identified another reason that discretion is tolerable.
They observed (as I remarked earlier) that pure discretion is actually
rare. As Justice Cardozo wrote,
Complete freedom-unfettered and undirected-there never is. A thousand
limitations-the product some of statute, some of precedent, some of vague
22. Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context,
47 Law & Contemporary Problems 157, 158-59 (1984).
23. As one conferee frankly put it, "Our judges aren't great, but they're competent.
They are the C students, not the best and the brightest.'' In this respect, it is noteworthy
that one conferee reported that judges were more likely to go astray on financial rather
than child-custody issues, since while the latter cases were emotionally difficult, the
former could be so complex and abstruse that judges would badly misunderstand the
issues they faced.
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tradition or of an immemorial technique-encompass and hedge us even
when we think of ourselves as ranging freely and at large .... Narrow at
best is any freedom that is allotted to us. 24

But what are these ''thousand limitations''? The conferees were specially interested in one such limitation that is notable but too little
noticed: Judges tend to curtail their own discretion. This tendency has
several practical sources.
Efficiency and fairness concerns, simple laziness, a wish to avoid responsibility, and even a desire to escape the boredom of constantly repeating the
reasoning necessary to decide a case can drive decision-makers toward
relying on their own earlier decisions in factually similar cases rather than
embarking on fresh discretionary frolics. 25

Thus a number of conferees reported that judges frequently devised and
deployed their own rules of thumb and that such rules of thumb could
become quite well known and even be formalized. There was even some
feeling that, far from searching for ways of expanding their discretionary authority, judges sometimes apply case-law or statutory rules mechanically and uncritically, treating them as easy ways out of hard
decisions.
Another means by which judges foreswear the discretion they might
exercise is by deferring to the parties and the witnesses. Most judges
are more than eager to persuade litigants to relieve the court of the entire
burden of decision by settling their dispute out of court. Similarly, some
conferees felt that judges sometimes deferred more than generously in
child-custody disputes to the preferences of guardians ad litem, the
recommendations of social workers, and the pronouncements of psychologists. 26
Furthermore, a multitude of other pressures crowd around the judge
and cabin judicial discretion. Those who appoint or select judges may
seek to limit judicial discretion by choosing judges who seem likely to
behave in desirable ways. Judges are generally socialized in the society
in which they work, and they have commonly internalized many of its
values (including the value of not abusing discretion). Judges have
undergone training designed to teach them to ''think like a lawyer,''
and thus to reject some kinds of judicial choices as unthinkable. And
24. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 61 (Yale U Press 1924).
25. Schneider, Discretion and Rules cited in note 6 at 82. For a first-rate description
of this tendency, see Richard Lempert, Discretion in a Behavioral Perspective: The
Case ofa Public Housing Eviction Board, in Keith Hawkins, ed., The Uses ofDiscretion
(Oxford U Press, 1992).
26. For carefully documented insights into this tendency, see Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations as Evidence in Divorce Cases, 21 Family L Q 149 (1987).
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the lessons of law school are often elaborated and reinforced by long
apprenticeships in the practice of law.
In addition, judges are subject to criticism from their local bar, from
their colleagues on the bench, and even from their friends and families.
Judges may be reversed if they misuse their discretion (an experience
judges tend to find disagreeable). In some jurisdictions, joint committees of lawyers and judges or surveys conducted by bar associations
provide forums in which the conduct of judges may be scrutinized. If
judges continually behave improperly, they are (ultimately, in principle) subject to discipline and even removal. And the conferees pointed
with particular approval to another limitation on judicial power: Judges
must follow procedural rules which limit what a judge hears, what a
judge can do, and when a judge can act.
One measure of the success of this host of confining forces is a fact
I mentioned before. A large number of practitioners were confident that
they could ordinarily predict how a judge would decide a case. This
suggests not only that judges were limited by the thousand constraints
surrounding them, but that they were limited in regularized, systematic
ways. It is, in short, the concerted pressure of these constraints that
makes discretion tolerable.

VI. Some Concluding Observations
We may briefly summarize the conference's thinking about the tension in family law between discretion and rules in this way. The conferees concluded that legal systems characteristically do not offer a choice
between discretion and rules, but rather develop for each substantive
area a mix of discretion and rules that falls somewhere along a continuum. They believed that that mix was dynamic, that it would change
according to the dynamics of the common law process and the developing attitudes and customs of the jurisdiction.
The conferees tended to think that the subjects family law regulates
are too multitudinous and multifarious to be satisfactorily reduced to
flat rules. But the conferees were simultaneously drawn to the efficiency
of rules and to their claims to serve the planning and expressive functions
better than discretion.
The conferees well understood some of the forces that limit the discretionary authority with which the family law judge seems so well endowed. They fully grasped that judges often seek to limit their own
powers by devising rules of thumb and by deferring to litigants and
experts. They perceived that judges are further inhibited by their socialization, their professional training, the criticism to which they are sub-
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ject, the institutional setting in which they must work, and by the procedural and substantive commands they must follow.
Most basically, I think, the conferees knew that the proper mix of
discretion and rules in any given area of law cannot be determined a
priori. The advantages and disadvantages of both discretion and rules
are numerous and interrelated in wickedly complex ways. All will
depend, then, on who the judges are, who the litigants are, what the
subject for decision is, and what political, social, economic, and legal
forces impinge on the decision.
All this, I think, fairly describes how the conferees analyzed the
questions placed before them. But it does not fully reflect all the concerns about discretion and rules in family law that many of the conferees
felt, and felt intensely. Let me close by sketching the most prominent
and penetrating of those concerns.
A number of the conferees felt that we are seeing a momentous
development in family law. As the rate of divorce has climbed to its
present height, as the population has become richer and thus better able
to buy legal services, and as a larger view of what constitutes a legal
problem has taken hold, the demand on family law for its services
has grown impressively. When an institution must provide extensive,
elaborate, and difficult services to multitudes of people, it quickly discovers that it is on the way toward becoming a bureaucracy.
Many of the conferees were afraid that we today are witnessing the
bureaucratization of family law. They saw the recent federal requirement that states adopt child-support guidelines as a telling step in that
direction. They believed that that bureaucratization was being hastened
along by another trend-the federalization of family law. Federal childsupport legislation is one example of this trend; federal responses to the
problem of child abuse are another. The conferees feared that, the more
family law responds to central commands, the more bureaucratic it must
become.
The bureaucratization of family law, of course, has deep and extensive consequences for the balance between rules and discretion. The
essential question of bureaucratic organization is how to control and
make consistent the similar decisions of legions of parallel decisionmakers. The standard answer to that question is to impose rules of an
effectively binding sort on those decision-makers-to deprive them of
their discretion.
Some conferees certainly appreciated the advantages of the bureaucratization of family law. A number of people asked whether we can
afford to offer individualized justice in an area where the demand for
it is great, its cost is overwhelming, and its success is questionable.
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Nevertheless, the movement toward bureaucratization disturbed some
of the conferees acutely.
The conferees who were concerned about the trend toward bureaucratization worried about what such a routinization of family law could
mean for them professionally. They feared that judges deprived of
discretion could hardly be distinguished from computers and that lawyers who argued to such judges could hardly be more than low-level
data processors.
But these conferees also saw the trend as frustrating their clients in the
way bureaucracies frustrate everyone-by being elaborately rule-bound
and unable to respond to the individual circumstances of real people.
"But we're supposed to be lawyers looking for justice," protested one
conferee. And we all wondered how far this might be possible in the
new world we face.

